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The sign of correlations between GDP growth in Japan and in emerging East Asian 
countries is ambiguous. Previous work found either consistently positive or consistently negative 
correlations. We propose using an integrated framework where cross-country correlations depend 
on the phase of the business cycle. For ten East Asian countries over 1975-2002 with quarterly 
GDP data, we consider a three-regime growth cycle setting in order to allow for catching-up 
effects. We examine to what extent correlations are sensitive to third country effects, 
transmission mechanisms and the quality of Japanese output data. When controlling for third-
country effects correlations with Japan are almost uniformly negative. By contrast, when we take 
into account transmission variables, positive correlations appear during rapid-growth periods for 
a core-group of five East Asian countries composed of China, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Korea. With higher quality data for output growth in Japan, symmetry of disturbances with Japan 
appears for the same group of countries in both growth-recessions and rapid-growth regimes. 
However synchronization with Japan is never present in the normal-growth regime. Since this 
core group of five countries is far from being fully synchronized with Japan, it may be somewhat 










1.  Introduction 
Especially under the impetus of the 1997-98 crisis, there has been a growing 
concern in East Asia about the necessity of developing regional cooperation. One of the 
factors of the crisis was the common de facto (uncoordinated) peg to an external currency 
(the dollar), and one of the manifestations of the crisis was competitive depreciation. As 
a result, the desirability of cooperation in the monetary field, particularly with some form 
of regional exchange rate arrangement, has monopolized the attention of a large part of 
the academic community. Coincidentally, this trend has been reinforced by emulation 
generated by the start of the last phase of monetary integration in Western Europe, with 
the locking of parities in early 1999. 
Analytically, it is acknowledged, mainly on the basis of the forty-year-old theory 
of optimum currency areas (Mundell, 1961) that the presence of co-fluctuations, or 
symmetry of shocks, among countries participating in regional currency arrangements, is 
one of the prerequisites for the success of such ventures. 
Empirically, active research has developed over the last five years to examine the 
extent of correlation of output shocks among East Asian countries with contradictory 
results. Evidence based on annual GDP growth data, using either simple correlations or 
correlations between supply shocks extracted from the residuals of structural vector 
autoregressive systems (SVARs), indicates high positive correlations between Japan and 
other East Asian countries. This would make a core group composed of Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan (Baek and Song, 2002) ripe for pegging to a 
basket giving a substantial weight to the yen (for a recent view on basket peg proposals: 
Ito and Park, 2002). By contrast, work using quarterly data and focusing on transmission 




Japanese growth with GDP growth in many East Asian countries are negative 
(Abesinghe and Forbes, 2002).  Such asymmetries would imply that arguments in favor 
of exchange rate arrangements giving some role to the yen in East Asia lack empirical 
support. 
The present paper aims at remedying some weaknesses of previous work which 
may explain such conflicting evidence. We document that correlations of East Asian 
countries’ growth with Japan depend on the phase of a common growth cycle. Most 
existing work which claims to study growth cycle synchronization, actually does not 
distinguish growth cycle phases. Such work just postulates that the clustering of turning 
points, i.e. synchronization between two countries’ growth series, is the same in 
recessions and expansions. We follow here an alternative approach, in which 
interdependencies and co-movements among countries are conditioned by the state of the 
growth cycle (Krolzig and Toro, 2001). Growth cycles are identified as regime shifts 
occurring simultaneously across countries. The international correlation of shocks may 
then differ between different growth cycle regimes. The growth cycle classification that 
we use leaves room for a regime of very fast growth corresponding to a ‘third’ state in 
growth cycle dynamics (Potter, 1995; Sichel, 1994). This third state could occur at the 
beginning of expansions (the ‘recovery’ stage, Friedman, 1993; Kim and Nelson, 1999), 
if high flexibility allows a quick recovery, or after expansions when cross-country 
catching up effects are at work. 
Previous work has suggested that the magnitude of cross-country growth 
correlations is mainly a function of bilateral trade flows. Inter-industry specialization 
would lead to less synchronization (Krugman, 1973) and intra-industry trade to more 
symmetry (Frankel and Rose, 1998). This overlooks the importance of further factors 




influence of world or regional cycles; multilateral trade flows, reflecting in particular 
common external shocks from a large country or competition in the domestic market of 
that country; and multilateral capital flows, such as FDI…, which play a major role in 
generating interdependencies in economic activity between countries, particularly as a 
source of intra-industry trade. 
Apart from these factors, very little attention has been granted to possible 
distortions in correlations due to data mismeasurement. When such worries are raised, 
they concern the reliability of high frequency data for GDP in developing countries, 
particularly in the early part of samples (Abesinghe and Forbes, 2002). However, it is 
acknowledged among specialists of Japanese national accounts that quarterly GDP 
estimations are not reliable (DNA, 2000), while alternative, higher quality, measures of 
Japanese output are available.  
We propose here an integrated approach aimed at taking into account all three 
aspects: the regime-dependent nature, and possible reversal, of correlations; missing 
variables; and the role of data mismeasurement. The basic methodological tool of the 
paper is a Markov-switching trivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) system which 
includes real GDP growth in an emerging East Asian country, as well as growth in Japan 
and in a third country, the U.S. This reflects our presumption that for an East Asian 
emerging country there are two anchor economies to which it is likely to be affiliated 
(Artis and Zhang, 1997, for the European case). However, we also consider other third 
countries within the region: Korea or China, and alternatively include transmission 
variables like export growth or the Japanese financial account. We use such regime-
dependent systems to examine correlation patterns for GDP growth between Japan and 
nine East Asian countries involving both NIEs (Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and 




China, over the longest available sample, i.e. the last 27 years with quarterly data
1. We 
finally consider alternative higher quality data for economic activity in Japan. 
We first provide in section two a sketch of the lessons to be drawn from previous 
work. We then present in section three a descriptive analysis of the data and the 
methodology used in the tests. Section four investigates correlations with Japan of East 
Asian countries over different phases of the growth cycle in systems allowing in turn for 
third country effects, transmission variables, and mismeasurement of the data. Section 
five offers an interpretation of the results and examines their implications for monetary 
integration in East Asia. Section six gives some conclusions. 
2.  Previous work: sometimes positive, sometimes negative correlations  
Typically, studies of economic linkages between Japan and East Asian countries 
(Goto and Hamada, 1994; Goto and Kawai, 2001) find a high degree of trade 
interdependence, particularly a high intensity of intra-industry trade (see below section 
5). Substantially positive correlations of GDP growth should be a natural byproduct of 
such high interdependence.  
From simple to conditional correlations in a two-step framework With annual 
data over the 1970-1995 period, Diwan and Hoekman (1999) examine relations between 
GDP growth in each of seven East-Asian economies and Japanese growth. They find a 
positive association, which tends to weaken over time, and turns negative for Hong Kong 
and China in the 1990s. They infer complementarity between Japan and East-Asian 
countries
2.  
                                                           
1 Indeed over a too short sample, the estimation may suffer from a Peso problem to the extent that the 
fraction of observations drawn from one particular regime in the available sample may not correspond to 
the population frequency of that regime. In such a case the estimation may be biased (Bekaert, Hodrick and 
Marshall, 1998). 
2 Kim, Kose and Plummer (2002) still with annual data, examine a longer sample, 1960 to 1996, with an 




Going further than simply looking at unconditional correlations, other work has  
conditioned on the past history of the variables, using standard linear VAR techniques 
(Selover, 1999 and 2003; Lee, Huh and Harris,1999; and Hsiao, Hsiao and Yamashita, 
2003) but only for a few pairs of East Asian countries. A weakness of such work is that it 
either postulates stability or decides a priori on dates of structural breaks. Finally, this 
work assumes linearity without ever testing for it.   
Other work uses annual data over 1970-1998 on linear bivariate VARs including 
GDP growth and inflation to decompose the residuals into supply and demand shocks 
depending on their (imposed) permanent or temporary effects (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1994). In their updating of such tests, Baek and Song (2002) mainly stress 
the results obtained for supply disturbances, since these disturbances are associated with 
the shocks to the real economy which shift the long run equilibrium in a permanent way. 
They identify a core group of East Asian countries characterized by positive correlations 
of their supply disturbances with similar disturbances in Japan. This core group includes 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan. By contrast such disturbances in 
China, the Philippines and Singapore are not significantly correlated with Japan. As we 
know, shocks to GDP growth include both supply and demand disturbances. Still, Baek 
and Song (2002) find that their core group of economies are also the only countries 
characterized by a high (positive) unconditional correlation of their growth rates with 
Japanese growth. This roughly suggests that GDP growth rates are closely associated 
with permanent or supply shocks. 
The following step in this line of enquiry consists in using trade flows as an 
explanatory variable of cross-country growth correlations. However, by themselves 
larger trade flows will not a priori lead to higher correlations. Greater inter-industry 




while, when intra-industry trade is the major component of international trade (Frankel 
and Rose, 1998), trade integration would lead to a rise in cross-country growth 
correlations. According to existing theory, higher trade integration can thus lead to either 
higher or lower growth cycle synchronization between countries, and the issue can only 
be resolved by empirical work (Kang and Wang, 2002). Since Frankel and Rose (1998), 
it has become customary to examine to what extent increased trade integration leads to 
higher growth correlations. After unconditional (or conditional) cross-country 
correlations have been computed, they are usually regressed on a number of candidate 
explanatory factors, such as trade flows. This line of enquiry has been pursued for East 
Asia for example by Crosby and Voss (2002) or Shin and Wang (2003).  
Transmission variables and third country effects It is tempting to integrate the two 
steps of the previous approach into a single one, by taking into account explanatory 
variables (such as trade flows, etc.) as transmission channels when measuring 
correlations
3. Thus Abeysinghe and Forbes (2001) use bilateral trade flows in East Asia 
over 1978-1998 to estimate a model linking output growth across countries. With 
quarterly data for real GDP, in a large number of cases the correlation between the 
residuals of a SVAR model is negative in East Asia. This is particularly the case between 
Japan and either (by decreasing order) Thailand, Singapore and, to a much lesser extent, 
Malaysia and Korea.  
There is thus conflicting evidence, with positive correlations between Japan and 
other East Asian countries, found in the previous approach, as opposed to negative 
correlations when accounting properly for bilateral trade flows. Apart from the poor 
quality of data, Abeysinghe and Forbes (2001) put forward two possible explanations of 
                                                           
3 Along another route, Marcellino et al. (2002) focus on a particular class of linear VARs whose parameters 




such negative correlations: i) omitted variables, especially cross-country linkages through 
other channels than direct (bilateral) trade flows -competition in third markets would be 
one such omitted variable-; ii) and mismeasurement of data. 
The literature which focused on bilateral trade flows has thus potentially missed a 
major variable: say if both Japan and Korea send a high share of their total exports to the 
United States, an additional channel of co-movement arises from such trade flows with 
third countries. If U.S. growth falls, growth will fall in both Japan and Korea. By 
contrast, if Korea out competes Japan in the U.S. market, a negative co-movement 
between Japanese and Korean growth will ensue. The major implication of this 
proposition is that, when measuring the correlation of output growth between two 
economies within a region, neglecting to condition on multilateral trade flows and/or 
growth in a large country outside the region, will bias the intra-regional correlations. This 
is true even if one controls for intra-regional bilateral trade.  
A complementary way to look at the same issue considers that the study of co-
movements, or cross-country growth correlations, should not be conducted only within a 
bilateral context. Indeed, if growth falls in Japan and this does not affect directly growth 
in Singapore, but generates a sharp fall in Korean growth, then the latter may lead to a 
fall in Singaporean growth. At the end of the day, movements in the Japanese growth 
cycle affect the growth cycle in Singapore. Indirect effects through third countries could 
thus magnify or invert direct, bilateral, effects.  
Another missing variable in existing work on co-fluctuations in East Asia is 
Japanese capital flows. Indeed, the integration of the production process in the region has 
relied heavily on foreign direct investment, in particular from Japan. This has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
transition variables to affect the business cycle dynamics and thus the correlation pattern of growth shocks 




shown to be a major engine of intra-industry trade in the region (see section 5 below), 
which itself generates growth cycle symmetries across countries. More generally, Japan 
has been a major source of other capital inflows for East Asian countries. Overall, the 
financial account of the Japanese balance of payments may be a good proxy for all these 
transmission mechanisms. 
Regime-dependent correlations: concordance and common cycles Most of the above- 
mentioned literature aims at studying growth cycle synchronization, and emphasizes 
linear models of aggregate output, but it does not distinguish growth cycle phases. Since 
Slutsky (1927) and Yule (1921) it is acknowledged that autoregressive processes convert 
serially uncorrelated shocks into persistent outputs and the dynamics then resembles 
closely the processes followed by growth cycle indicators. Such a tradition has led to 
multivariate analyses, as in the vector autoregressive model a la Sims (1980). An 
alternative tradition, a la Burns and Mitchell (1946) favors non linearities, through its 
emphasis on successive periods of expansion and contraction. This second tradition is 
able to identify turning points in economic activity. Indeed “it is only within a regime-
switching framework that the concept of a turning point has intrinsic meaning…In linear 
frameworks, by way of contrast, there are no turning points, or switch times, in 
probabilistic structure” (Diebold and Rudebusch, 1999, p. 15). In a multivariate context, 
the combination of the two traditions has led to the development of regime-switching 
VAR models (Krolzig, 2000). 
This new wave of empirical modeling considers it likely that cross-country 
correlations differ between different phases of the business cycle, when a large part of 
previous work just postulated that the clustering of turning points -i.e. synchronization
4 
                                                           
4  As defined rigorously by Harding and Pagan (2002), synchronization can be viewed as the phenomenon 
whereby turning points of two series cluster at particular dates. To measure it one has to determine the co-




between two countries’ output series- is the same in recessions and expansions. An 
avenue worth exploring for explaining the conflicting evidence on correlations in East 
Asia is that the degree, and even the sign, of international interdependence could vary 
over different growth-cycle regimes. Such a possibility has been considered for G7 
countries by Krolzig (2000) who uncovered negative correlations with the U.S. prior to 
1973 and positive ones subsequently (on west European economies, see Artis, Krolzig 
and Toro, 1999) but was overlooked by previous work dealing with East Asia. 
In the study of the similarities between different countries’ growth cycles it is 
necessary to identify coincident turning points for the set of economies, but this is not a 
sufficient condition for synchronization (Krolzig and Toro, 2001). In order to measure 
co-movements
5 between output growth among different economies we should test for 
both concordance and correlation (Harding and Pagan, 2002b). Concordance refers to the 
fraction of time that two countries spend in the same growth cycle phase, while 
correlation measures the extent to which turning points in the two growth cycles occur 
near each other. A country by country analysis of growth cycles phases can be used to 
conduct concordance tests, while a multicountry system analysis of such phases allows 
us to compute regime-dependent correlations. 
Regime-switching techniques are used by Girardin (2003) to examine the 
asymmetry and synchronization of quarterly industrial output growth cycles between 
eight North and South-East Asian countries. Based on the estimated Markov-switching 
models for each individual country, non-parametric tests of concordance of growth 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
obtains when all specific cycles are in the same phase at the same time, and thus have identical turning 
points. 
5 Lee Park and Shin (2002) extract East Asian common shocks with Kalman filters and, in the spirit of the 
two-step approach, regress the fraction of a country’s output variation due to that common shock on a 
number of potential explanatory variables. However the unobserved component model is unfortunately 




cycles imply that there is asymmetry and low synchronization between Japan’s growth 
cycle and the cycle of other East Asian nations 
In the common cycle VAR approach, the interdependence and co-movements 
among countries are conditioned by the state of the growth cycle (Krolzig and Toro, 
2001). Growth cycles are identified as regime shifts occurring simultaneously across 
countries. The international correlation of shocks may differ between different growth 
cycle regimes. The regime in which a given country is at the time of a major shock, like a 
sharp fall in output growth in one country, say Japan, could affect the magnitude and 
possibly the sign of the transmission of such a shock. Imagine that the correlation is high 
during expansions but low or even negative during growth recessions. In that case the 
shock could make the region switch to a recessionary regime, leading to a sharp fall in 
correlations. In other words, a negative growth shock in Japan would lead other East 
Asian economies to disconnect themselves from growth movements in Japan. The shock 
would lead to a shift in the pattern of interdependence among output growth rates in the 
region, a regime shift.  
3.  Stylized facts and methodology. 
3.1. Stylized facts 
We will focus here on growth cycles. This is an old concept (Zarnowitz, 1991) 
which was used in early indexes of general business conditions and trade. Growth cycles 
differ from business cycles not only quantitatively but qualitatively. A lot of work on 
growth cycles in numerous Western (but few, mostly north, East Asian) countries was 
conducted by Mintz at the NBER and Moore at the CIBCR. When carefully interpreted, 
growth cycles provide lessons on when and how expansions speed up and slow down, 
and retardations do not develop into contractions. The usefulness of the distinction was 




recession prevailed strongly before the 1990s, while slowdowns with recession were 
more common in other G7 countries. “Growth cycles include both types of slowdown, 
hence are much more numerous than business cycles that are defined by the presence of 
absolute decreases in aggregate activity (recessions)” (Zarnowitz, 1991, p. 42).   
The quarterly data for GDP (Taiwan GNP) that we use for ten East Asian 
countries plus the United States start in the first quarter of 1975 for all countries except 
China, 1978. The source of the GDP data is the International Financial Statistics CD 
Rom of the I.M.F., except for Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, where the source is 
national statistical offices. For five countries, quarterly data was unavailable in the earlier 
part of the sample. For China, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, we thus 
used the data interpolated with the Chow-Lin related series technique, as computed by 
Abeysinghe and Gulasekaran at the University of Singapore. For all countries our sample 
ends with the third quarter of 2002. Our choice of countries is thus the same as in 
Abeysinghe and Forbes (2002) but our sample is three years longer at the beginning as 
well as at the end. Subsequently we will use export growth (in dollars) for nine East 
Asian countries (given the unavailability of data on export volumes for most countries in 
the sample) and the Japanese financial account (JFA) as a proportion of Japanese GDP.  
Such data come from the International Financial Statistics CD Rom of the I.M.F. Finally 
we will use a high quality quarterly output series for (“all industrial” activity) in Japan 
(see section 4.4. below), starting in 1993, computed by METI, which covers the 
construction sector (weight 8.24), the industrial sector (22.8), the tertiary sector (60.6), 
and public administration (8.35). All series were deseasonalized with Census X12. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Descriptive statistics for the quarterly growth rate of GDP are given in table 1 for 




Philippines, while China enjoyed GDP growth three times as fast as the worst 
performers. Volatility of output growth is larger in emerging countries than in Japan. It is 
highest in Hong Kong and Korea. Only for Indonesia are the largest quarterly downturns 
more severe than the largest quarterly upturns, while for Japan, Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand downturns and upturns are almost as equally severe. Signs of asymmetry in the 
distribution of the growth series are widespread. Skewness is particularly negative for 
Indonesia.  It is also negative for most other countries, except Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Excess kurtosis is mostly present in Korea and Malaysia, but it is particularly striking for 
Indonesia. 
Unit-root tests both on the level (in log) and the growth rate of output using both 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Philipps-Peron (PP) tests, should enable us 
to get information on the stationarity of the data. According to both tests (not reported for 
lack of space) the level of real GDP would have a unit root for all countries. We also 
used the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al, 1992) which has stationarity as the null. Such a 
null is rejected for the level of output. Nelson, Piger and Zivot (2000) evaluated the 
performance of unit root tests when the true data generating process undergoes regime 
switching but is otherwise stationary. Their work implies that ADF tests do a poor job of 
distinguishing such a model from an integrated process, and that Philipps-Perron tests, 
which allow for structural breaks, also have very low power in such a case. A similar 
problem is met when considering the growth rate of GDP where all tests (again not 
reported) mostly conclude at stationarity. We still decided to implement the regime 
switching analysis on the growth rate of output since we are interested in studying 
growth correlations.  




As a benchmark for subsequent estimates we present unconditional correlations 
on annual data in the second column of table 2.  For all East Asian countries, except 
China and the Philippines, the correlation of annual GDP growth rates with Japan is 
positive and significant and varies between 0.3 and 0.6. With official Japanese quarterly 
data the unconditional correlation of growth rates (table 2, column 3) remains 
consistently positive between Japan and six other East Asian countries over the last 27 
years but drops substantially (it ranges from 0.1 to 0.25). China, Korea and the 
Philippines share a correlation with Japanese growth close to zero. The use of higher 
quality data for Japanese output (see below section 4.4) generates much larger cross-
country correlations (by a factor of 0.5 to 3) which are all significant, except for China 
(table 2 column 4). The low quality of official quarterly Japanese data is thus a source of 
underestimation of correlations. 
[Tables 3a, 3b, 3c about here] 
With annual data, in a bivariate linear VAR (with one lag), correlations of growth in 
an East Asian country with Japanese growth are positive and similar to the unconditional 
ones, except for a sharp rise for Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, and a substantial fall for 
Taiwan (table 3a columns 5). Controlling for a third country effect by including GDP growth 
of the United States leads to a marginal rise in correlations with Japan for most countries, but 
no change for China, the Philippines and Taiwan (table 3a columns 2). When China or Korea 
are included as an alternative third country there is almost not change in correlations 
compared to the bivariate case (table 3a columns 3 and 4).  
With quarterly data in a similar trivariate VAR (with two lags) including either the 
U.S., Korea or China as a third country, conditional correlations with Japan are  not 
significant, except in the case of Malaysia, and Hong Kong, but only when China is included. 




growth, or the Japanese financial account (as a ratio to GDP), as alternative control variables 
delivers a similar message (table 3b, columns 5 and 6). By itself the use of high-quality 
Japanese output data does not alter much the general picture on correlation patterns but in 
addition to the rise in the correlation with Malaysia, there is some weak evidence of a positive 
correlation with Japan for Hong Kong, Indonesia and the Philippines in the system with the 
United States (table 3c, column 2). Conditioning on export growth delivers a significant 
positive correlation with China.  
These results show how the use of low-frequency (annual) data leads to an impression 
of high GDP growth correlation between Japan and other East Asian countries which nearly 
vanishes when turning to quarterly data. The use of high quality Japanese output data 
improves correlations, but only at the margin. The fall as the frequency rises is important 
because the optimum currency area criterion on co-fluctuations refers to cycles, which in the 
tradition of NBER methodology are always empirically examined at a quarterly frequency.  
3.2.  Methodology. 
From two to three growth regimes In the regime-switching literature, it is customary 
since Hamilton (1989) to divide the growth cycle into two phases, negative trend growth 
and positive trend growth, and to assume that the economy switches between them 
according to a latent state variable. Accordingly, following the trough of a recession, 
since output switches back to the expansion growth phase, it will never regain the ground 
lost during the downturn. The effects of growth recessions on the level of output will thus 
be permanent. This is a strong view of growth cycle patterns which has been challenged 
by some authors (Kim and Piger, 2000) on the basis of an alternative model where 
recessions are characterized as periods where output is hit by large negative transitory 
shocks, labeled ‘plucks’ by Friedman (1993). According to such a view, following the 




back effect’ or ‘peak reversion’ is the critical phase of Friedman’s (1993) model, revived 
by Kim and Nelson (1999). Output then begins a normal, slower-growth, expansion 
phase (see also Sichel, 1994). On this basis a number of researchers have suggested using 
a three-regime model of the growth cycle to capture recessions as well as rapid-growth 
episodes, viewed respectively as persistent positive and negative deviations in the mean 
growth rate from the ‘normal’ long term growth rate (Krolzig, 2000). Alternatively, the 
rapid-growth regime has been viewed as accounting for the convergence process or the 
catching up of middle income countries. Rapid growth would thus follow expansions, 
and precede recessions. While the latter view has been essentially focused on the South 
European case, it is of clear relevance to the East Asian one. In the light of this, it is 
important to allow for the possibility of a third regime for output growth and examine the 
validity of either of the alternative views. 
Regime switching in a VAR framework  In the literature on growth cycle co-
movements among macroeconomic time series have increasingly been examined within a 
framework allowing for regime-switching (Krolzig, 2001). In a regime-switching model 
of the growth cycle some or all parameters of a time-series model of several output 
variables depend on an underlying unobservable stochastic variable st, which aims at 
representing the phases of the cycle. This approach enables us to assign probabilities to 
the occurrence of the different regimes. In its most popular version, which we will use 
here, such a model assumes that the process st is a first-order Markov process (Hamilton, 
1994).   
Hamilton’s (1989) original specification assumed that a change in regime 
corresponds to an immediate one-time jump in the process mean. We rather consider the 




one regime to another
6. We do it in an extension of Hamilton’s approach to a regime-
switching VAR system (Krolzig, 1998). For a VAR of order two with a vector of output 
growth (∆yt) for n countries, such a specification would imply a model such as: 
∆y t = Θ(st)  + A1(st)  ∆y t -1+   A 2(st)  ∆y t -2 +  (Σm)
1/2 (st)
 
 εt   (1) 
We allow for the vectors of intercepts or variances and the matrices of auto-
regressive parameters to differ between three regimes
7. The vector of intercepts Θ(st) 
thus switches between three states: a first regime with negative or very low growth 
(‘growth recessions’), a second regime of moderate growth (‘normal growth’), and a 
regime of accelerated growth (‘rapid growth’). With Markov-switching 
heteroscedasticity, the variance of errors can differ between the three regimes ((Σm)1/2  is 
the square root of the variance-covariance matrix). After the change in regime there is an 
immediate one-time jump in the variance of errors. It is expected that the variance will be 
higher during the rapid growth than during the growth-recession regime. The normal-
growth regime is expected to be the least volatile. In the presence of such regime-
dependent variances, the cross-country correlation of shocks will change between 
regimes. Such regime-dependent correlations represent the maintained hypothesis of this 
paper. The autoregressive parameters given by the A matrices are also allowed to switch 
between states. We use likelihood ratio tests to check that any of these three sources of 
switching is statistically acceptable
8. For a given parametric specification of the model, 
                                                           
6 The specification in (1) thus differs from Hamilton’s since it implies different dynamic adjustments of the 
observed variables after a change in regime. Indeed the permanent regime shift in the mean would lead to 
an immediate jump of the growth rate of output to its new level. By contrast, a once-and-for all shift in the 
intercept generates a dynamic response of the growth rate which is similar to the response to an equivalent 
shock in the white noise series of the residuals. 
7  We take the example of two lags which will be used in the subsequent tests. 
8 When testing the Markov-switching model against the linear alternative or a m regime model against an 
(m-1) regime model, standard distribution theory does not apply (Davies, 1977) since a nuisance parameter 
(i.e. the transition probabilities) is not identified under the null hypothesis. The test proposed by Hansen 
(1992) and Garcia (1998) is conservative, tending to be under-sized and of low power. Ang and Bekaert 
(1998) conducted Monte Carlo experiments which imply that the true underlying distribution may be 
approximated by a χ




(constant) probabilities are assigned to the unobserved regimes –recession, expansion 
and rapid-growth- conditional on the available information set which constitute an 
optimal inference on the latent state of the economy. We thus obtain the probability of 
staying in a given regime when starting from that regime, as well as the probabilities of 
shifting to another regime. 
The classification of regimes and the dating of the growth cycle imply that every 
observation in the sample is assigned to a regime s (s=1,2,3). The rule followed to assign 
an observation at time t to a specific regime depends on the highest smoothed 
probability. The smoothed probability of being in a given regime is computed by using 
all the observations in the sample. We assign an observation to a specific regime when 
the smoothed probability of being in that regime is higher than one half. Generally, one 
also reports the filtered probability, which is computed by using only observations in the 
sample up to time t-1. 
The multivariate Markov-switching model as represented in equation (1) can both 
picture the non linear nature of the growth cycle through regime switching, and the 
common factor structure of the cycle (Krolzig, 2001). Such a Markov-switching vector 
autoregressive model will characterize growth cycles for different countries as common 
regime shifts in the stochastic process of the series. 
4.  Correlation of output shocks in regime-switching VARs. 
The initial regime-switching VAR specification that we use includes growth in an East 
Asian country of interest, plus Japanese growth and growth in a large third country. The 
third country is the United States in the basic specification in order to allow for the 
impact of world growth cycles. The economies of Japan and the U.S. are taken as the 
leading ‘anchor’ economies which may provide an attractor for the East Asian economies 




is the third country. In a further step, the third variable in the system controls for 
multilateral export growth of the country of interest or for the Japanese multilateral 
financial account. We then consider the impact on correlations of correcting for data 
mismeasurement, both with the initial specifications and when controlling for 
transmission variables. 
4.1.Basic specification with the USA as a third country 
Specification search For the choice of lag length for each system, there is a trade-off 
between the precision of the estimation and the optimum lag. On this basis, the lag of the 
autoregression is taken equal to two for all systems, even though information criteria 
(Akaike, Hannah-Quinn and Schwartz) would often favor using only one lag. Indeed, 
with only one lag the variance-covariance matrix is often non-invertible. 
When testing for the relevant specification we considered four stages. In the first 
stage when we test (with a likelihood ratio test) for a two-regime model against the linear 
VAR, we uniformly reject the latter (table 4, column 4). This shows that previous work 
using time invariant linear VARs missed an important dimension. Second, a two-regime 
model is not a full description of the growth cycle for systems including any East Asian 
country over the last three decades. The test of three versus two regimes rejects the lower 
number of states (table 4, column 3). The assumption of a data generating process 
shifting between only two regimes seems too restrictive to account for rapid-growth 
episodes. The third important step is whether the variance switches between regimes. The 
last column of table 4 implies that for all countries such a shifting-variance hypothesis is 
accepted at the five percent level (except Taiwan 10%). Finally, we select a switching- 
intercept model with shifting variance and autoregressive coefficients for all trivariate 
systems except in the case of Singapore where autoregressive parameters do not shift 




[Table 4 about here] 
For systems with any of the nine East Asian countries, we thus reject the linear 
model and accept the existence of a third regime on top of the usual regimes of growth  
recession and normal growth. Moreover, we accept the assumption of cross-country 
growth correlations depending on the growth cycle regime.  
Regime-dependent growth and volatility We identify regimes on the basis of the 
regime characterizing the emerging country of interest and disregard the regime in Japan 
or the United States. As reported in table 5 (columns 2 to 4), three countries, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand, are characterized by negative growth during growth recessions 
(from -1 to nearly -3 percent per quarter). Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Taiwan have zero growth during growth recessions and China has positive growth (1.44 
percent per quarter). Korea is special, with two regimes of negative growth, a low-
volatility one (regime 3) and a high-volatility one (regime 1). By contrast, Singapore has 
two regimes of normal growth, respectively with high (regime 2) and low volatility 
(regime 3). For five countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Singapore) growth recessions are the most volatile regime. For China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, the most volatile regime is the rapid-growth one, while for Thailand it is the 
normal-growth regime (table 5 columns 4 to 6). The fall in output growth between 
normal-growth and growth-recession regimes is small for China, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines and Taiwan (less than one percent at a quarterly rate), sizeable for Indonesia, 
Singapore and Thailand (2.5 percent) and very large for Korea and Malaysia (around 4 
percent). The rise in output growth between the normal and rapid-growth regimes is 
generally around 2.5 percent with a smaller rise for Indonesia (1.5) and Thailand (0.5). 




As is apparent from table 6 (columns 5 to 7), the duration of rapid-growth 
episodes is longer than for growth recessions, and the normal-growth regime is always 
the longest lasting, with China as a special case. There is a low probability of persistence 
of growth recessions in Malaysia and the Philippines, where the duration of this regime is 
lower than two quarters.  
Figures plotting the estimated smoothed (using the whole sample) and filtered 
(using only past data) probabilities of the three regimes for all nine systems are given in 
the Appendix. In the overwhelming majority of cases (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand), the rapid-growth regime follows the normal-
growth regime and not the growth-recession regime. This result invalidates Friedman’s 
plucking model for East Asia, but supports the catching up hypothesis. Available 
evidence for Western Europe over 1970-1997 similarly supports the catching up 
hypothesis (Artis, Krolzig and Toro, 1999).  
[Table 6 about here] 
As seen on the graphs in the Appendix, a remarkable feature of systems involving 
ASEAN4 countries is that the rapid-growth regime almost vanished after 1990. Among 
the NIEs, catching up was already over after 1980 in Korea, and 1985 in Hong Kong, but 
seems to have lasted for Taiwan as late as for ASEAN4. 
Regime-dependent correlations In the trivariate Markov-switching VARs including 
Japanese growth and U.S. growth (table 7, columns 2 to 4), for two groups of countries, 
correlations with Japan keep the same sign between the extreme regimes: rapid growth 
(regime 1) and growth recessions (regime 3). Indeed, a positive correlation is maintained 
for Malaysia and Thailand, but the correlation with Japan remains high during growth 
recessions for Malaysia (which are always short-lived, see Appendix), while it falls 




between the two extreme regimes for Hong Kong. A negative correlation is also present 
for Korea in its two growth-recession regimes and for Singapore in its growth-recession 
and low-volatility normal-growth regimes. 
Correlations change sign between the rapid-growth and growth-recession regimes 
for Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan, where they go from positive to negative, and 
for China where they switch from negative to zero. In the normal-growth regime, 
correlations with Japan are zero or close to it (Malaysia) for all countries, except Taiwan, 
where the correlation is negative. We included the bivariate system, without a third 
country, for comparison in table 7 (columns 5 to 7). The omission of the U.S. gives the 
impression that Hong Kong (Indonesia and Korea) is (are) positively correlated with 
Japan in (the rapid-growth regime) both growth-recession and normal-growth regimes. 
[Table 7 about here] 
All this implies that negative correlations with Japan are the rule in the growth-
recession regime. In the normal-growth regime correlations are generally zero, while 
evidence of positive correlations is manifest in the rapid-growth regime only for 
ASEAN4 countries, as well as Taiwan. 
4.2. China or Korea as a third country 
In the trivariate regime-switching systems including Korea as an alternative third 
country, correlations with Japan are no more positive and significant in the rapid-growth 
regime for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan, but are slightly positive for 
China (table 8 columns 2 to 4). Taiwan has a very substantial negative correlation with 
Japan. Correlations with Japan are still zero in the normal-growth regime, with the 
exception of China, Indonesia and the Philippines with negative correlations. In the 
growth-recession regime correlations with Japan are hardly affected and remain negative. 




When China is included in the trivariate regime-switching systems instead of Korea, in 
the rapid-growth regime, there are far less positive correlations with Japan than in the systems 
with U.S. growth (table 8 columns five to seven). In that regime, positive correlations are 
present only for the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Positive correlations with Japan are 
present neither in the growth-recession regime, nor in the normal-growth regime, except for 
Malaysia in the latter regime.  
Overall, the inclusion of alternative third countries to the U.S. confirms the negative 
sign of correlations with Japan in the growth-recession regime, with only a few exceptions. In 
the normal-growth regime correlations remain close to zero. Positive correlations remain for 
only a few South-East Asian countries in the normal-growth regime. 
4.3. Multilateral trade or financial flows as transmission variables 
We now study the impact of the inclusion of either multilateral trade growth or of 
the Japanese financial account as a third variable in the system. This should enable us to 
control for transmission variables which are likely to play a major role in East Asia, 
given the importance of intra-regional trade as well as of financial flows from Japan to its 
regional partners in the form of both foreign direct investment and bank lending. 
Export growth In the regime-switching systems including multilateral export growth
9 of 
the country of interest as a third variable alongside Japanese growth, positive correlations 
with Japan in the rapid-growth regime appear like in the system with U.S. growth for 
ASEAN4 countries, with the addition of China, Korea and Singapore. The correlation for 
Taiwan becomes insignificant (table 9, column 4). A negative correlation remains only 
for Hong Kong. In the normal-growth regime, the correlation remains close to zero for 
most countries, but Korea now has a positive correlation with Japan. A substantial 




In the growth-recession regime, correlations with Japan are uniformly negative, except 
for Malaysia and Thailand (zero correlation).  
Capital flows When the third variable in the regime-switching system is the Japanese 
financial account (JFA) as a share of Japanese GDP, compared with the system including 
trade flows, in the rapid-growth regime Taiwan is added to the group of countries with 
positive correlations with Japan, but the correlation turns negative for the Philippines. In 
the normal-growth regime, correlations with Japan become negative for China, Singapore 
and Taiwan, but no more so for Indonesia. In the growth-recession regime correlations 
become even more negative for most countries. 
[Table 9 about here] 
Accounting for transmission mechanisms instead of third country effects thus 
does not alter correlations with Japan in the growth-recession regime. By contrast, in the 
rapid-growth regime, the inclusion of export growth tends to enlarge the group of 
economies positively correlated with Japan to all countries except Hong Kong. A similar 
movement is not present in the normal-growth regime. 
4.4. Low quality of data as a source of distortion 
It is tempting to explain the overall lack of symmetry with Japan, especially in the 
growth-recession regime, by the dismal and atypical performance of Japan in the 1990s, 
or by the observation that Japan did not suffer from contagion and did not aggravate the 
impact of the crisis of its partners. It could be a reassuring fact that East Asian countries 
were not correlated with Japanese output growth movements over this period. However, 
before concluding too readily in favor of such a view, one should examine the validity of 
an alternative reason for the counterintuitive finding of negative correlations with Japan. 
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Such a particularly robust pattern in the growth-recession regime could be due to 
distortions in the measure of GDP.  
Abeysinghe and Forbes (2002) refer to the poor quality of East Asian GDP data, 
but they apparently have in mind the early part of the sample for emerging countries. 
However, doubts have often been raised about the quality of Japanese quarterly GDP 
statistics. The National Accounts Department (NAD, 2000) itself acknowledged that 
while the annual estimation of GDP employs reliable supply-side statistics, the split of 
such data between quarters mainly depends on the quarterly pattern in demand side 
statistics, which is sometimes considered far less accurate given the sampling nature of 
such data. This was mainly due to the fact that, for a long time, supply-side data were 
considered not as reliable as demand-side data at the quarterly frequency. Very recently 
(DNA, 2002) the method employed for the quarterly GDP estimates was put in partial 
conformity with the method used for annual estimates and thus now uses supply-side 
statistics and demand-side ones at the same time. However since such data are not 
available over a long sample, another avenue seems worth exploring. Since 1993, METI 
computes a measure of all-industry output for Japan, which is generally considered to be 
of much better quality than official GDP series
10.  
[Table 10 about here] 
We thus generated a mixed series of Japanese growth by using the official GDP 
series
11 up to the first quarter of 1993 and the all-industry output series subsequently. As 
shown in table 10, column 2, when controlling for the U.S. as a third country, for the 
growth-recession regime, correlations obtained with this mixed series yield strong 
                                                           
10 I am grateful to Alistair Barr, at the Japanese desk of the Bank of England, for pointing to the existence 
of such data. 
11 Such a stacking may be reasonable since, in private conversation K. Nishimura indicated that the bias in 




evidence of symmetry between Japan and either China, Hong-Kong, Korea, Malaysia or 
Taiwan. The third-country effect plays an important role here since such positive 
correlations are absent in the bivariate system, except for Hong-Kong (table 10, column 
5). When we alternatively control for the Japanese financial account (table 11, column 4) 
we also get symmetry with Japan in the growth-recession regime for the same group of 
countries, but Singapore replaces Taiwan. When own-country multilateral export growth 
is controlled for, during growth-recessions symmetry with Japan is only valid for 
Singapore, and Korea (table 11 column 2).  
[Table 11 about here] 
In the rapid-growth regime, symmetry with Japan occurs again for Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Taiwan in the system with U.S. growth (table 10 column 4). This result is 
similar to what we obtained in the basic specification above (table 7), except that the 
Philippines and Thailand have been left out. Such a similarity would not be surprising 
since, for the former countries, rapid-growth episodes concern mostly periods up to 1990, 
while our high quality data for Japanese output only start in 1993. Symmetry in the rapid-
growth regime is present only for China, when accounting for either transmission 
mechanism, as well as for Singapore (Taiwan), when controlling for export growth 
(Japanese financial flows). In the normal-growth regime, ASEAN3 (Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand) and Korea have now positive correlation with Japan in the 
systems including either U.S. growth or own-export growth, and Hong Kong in the 
system with Japanese financial flows. 
The surprising negative correlations with Japan in the growth-recession regime, 
which characterized low quality Japanese output data, almost vanish. Indeed, with high 
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quality data, the correlations very often turn positive. This is particularly the case for 
China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan, which share a positive correlation with Japan in 
the rapid-growth regime, while Korea joins this group with positive correlations (with 
Japan) in the growth-recession regime. Such symmetries are mostly robust to the 
inclusion of financial flows as a transmission variable in the system. 
5.  Interpretation and implications for East Asian monetary integration 
In the previous section, we have provided some evidence on regime-dependent 
growth cycle interdependencies within East Asia. As seen in section two above, previous 
work ignoring such regime-dependence found that a core group of East Asian countries 
positively correlated with Japan included ASEAN countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand. Using official GDP data, we find that such countries do belong to this core 
group only during the rapid-growth regime, which almost vanished in the 1990s after the 
end of catching up. However, with the exception of Malaysia, this evidence disappears 
when we control for transmission variables like export growth or Japanese financial 
flows. In the rapid-growth regime, such control leads to positive correlations with Japan 
for an alternative core group of countries composed of China, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
possibly Korea. The use of high quality Japanese output data after 1992, controlling for 
transmission variables, confirms the evidence of symmetry with Japan for this core group 
plus Malaysia both during growth-recession and rapid-growth regimes (except for 
Korea). In the rapid-growth regime, such evidence of symmetry with Japan is most 
robust for China. This raises two questions: Can we explain the importance of 
transmission mechanisms and is there any evidence of a change in the 1990s? 
Transmission mechanisms There is only limited available systematic empirical 
evidence on the structure of East Asian trading relationships and of trade links with 




transmission of shocks through trade flows, which derive from the location of the 
production process in different countries, may be substantially different from that of the 
traditional trade in final goods. In other words, bilateral trade, which is the usual channel 
for international transmission of a shock or cyclical phase, may not be able to capture all 
the components of international transmission. Indirect trade channels running along the 
chain of production may be equally –if not more- relevant. This has important 
consequences for the international propagation of shocks. Isogai, Morishita and Rüffer 
(2002) emphasize this point in their statistical analysis of the relationships between Japan 
and East Asia, taking the latter as a block. They focus on the nature of dynamic trade 
interdependencies created by increasing integration of East Asia into the global trading 
and production systems, leading to increasing internationalization of the production 
process. The main result of their study is that indirect shock transmission channels along 
the production chain are quantitatively significant. An increase in Japanese exports (parts 
and intermediate inputs) to other East Asian countries is followed by a rise in intra East 
Asian trade, and subsequently by a rise in East Asian exports to the US. Such patterns of 
globalization are very likely to play a major role behind the finding of a third-country 
effect in accounting for correlations of growth cycles between Japan and any East Asian 
country. This would also explain why multilateral exports from an East Asian country do 
seem to be the relevant transmission variable. 
The rapid development of intra-industry trade in the region seems to be highly 
dependent on the rise in foreign direct investment in East Asia. In an econometric study 
of the electrical machinery industry in East Asia, Fukao, Ishido and Ito (2003) find that 
FDI has a strongly positive impact on vertical intra-industry trade
12. Controlling for the 




section four above aimed at accounting for such a role of foreign direct investment as a 
transmission variable.  
Rise in intra-industry trade in the 1990s Would the rise in intra-industry trade with 
Japan in the 1990s seem sufficient to generate the symmetry in some phases of the 
growth cycles we found between Japan and a group of five East Asian countries, 
including particularly China? It may not be a coincidence that China itself is a good 
example of the rise of vertical intra-industry trade with Japan in the 1990s. This is 
apparent when considering Japanese bilateral trade data (Fukao, Ishido and Ito, 2003). In 
the late nineties, Japan imported from China and Hong Kong around 220 (39.5) billion 
yens of telecommunication equipment and parts (television sets), and exported more than 
270 (37.5) billion to the same area. In the electrical machinery industry, the share of 
vertical intra-industry trade in China’s trade with Japan is now larger than in Taiwanese 
or Korean trade. For China the share rose remarkably from less than 10 percent in 1988 
to 20 percent in 1992 and nearly 60 percent in 2000, thus overtaking Taiwan. Among 
East Asian countries, only Korea has ever reached such a high share. The other country 
for which the share has witnessed a spectacular growth is Singapore, with 20 percent up 
to the mid nineties, and more than 40 percent by 2000. As for other ASEAN countries, 
Malaysia has seen a declining share. From more than 50 percent in 1994, it went down to 
34 percent in 2000 (Fukao, Ishido and Ito, 2003)  
Isogai, Morishita and Rüffer (2002) computed intra-industry indices, using 
Aquino’s Q, which removes the distortion in the Grubel-Lloyd index
13 induced by 
unbalanced trade (exports and imports differing by a wide margin). In their computations 
for all industries (SITC 1 digit base) and the 1990s, the NIE3 (excluding Taiwan) are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Horizontal intra-industry trade corresponds to products differentiated by attributes, while vertical 




close to 80 (among which Singapore has the highest level with over 90), China is just 
above 60 and the ASEAN4 under 70, with Japan under 50. By contrast, when 
considering trade in machinery and transportation equipment, the NIEs have reached 75 
in the second half of the nineties, with Singapore, like Japan, close to 80, and China 
rapidly rising, with over 70 (65 in the first half of the nineties), while the ASEAN4 have 
only reached 64, rising only slowly (with the exception of the Philippines with a very fast 
rise).   
Implications for monetary integration in East Asia As far as East Asian monetary 
integration is concerned, the evidence gathered in this paper has mixed implications. On 
the one hand, in the 1990s, since China, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan (and possibly 
Korea) have shown signs of synchronization with Japan during the recession and rapid-
growth phases of their growth cycle, such countries would seem to be in the core group 
possibly suitable for some form of exchange rate arrangement involving the yen. This 
result is in stark contrast to both the estimations of linear VARs presented in section two 
above, and the results based on the correlation of supply shocks extracted from SVARs 
(Baek and Song, 2002), which exclude China and Singapore from the core group but 
include Hong Kong, Indonesia and Thailand. Our results with regime-dependent 
correlations would thus seem to overturn conventional wisdom on the appropriate 
members of an “optimum currency area” in East Asia. However, for at least two reasons, 
this does not imply that monetary integration in East Asia should proceed quickly. First, 
possibly either because of the low quality of Japanese output data prior to 1993 or of 
Japanese quasi-stagnation in the 1990s, in the normal-growth regime of the growth cycle 
our core group of countries show no sign of symmetry with Japan. Second, a large part of 
the symmetries uncovered may be driven by the common factor of exports to the U.S., 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




which is certainly a very different situation from the one which characterized West 
European countries. By the 1980s, when they pegged their mutual exchange rates, the 
latter had refocused their growth cycle dependence on Germany and no more on the US 
(Artis and Zhang, 1997). A similar refocusing towards Japan may not yet be over in the 
East Asian case. 
6.   Conclusion  
We obtained three series of results in the study of output growth correlations 
between Japan and other East Asian countries over the 1975-2002 period. 
First, the use of low frequency (annual) data with unconditional correlations 
generates a core group of East Asian countries significantly positively correlated with 
Japan: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand, and a non-core 
group of economies which are negatively or not correlated with Japan: China, the 
Philippines and Singapore. This remains true (with the exception of Singapore) in a 
linear vector autoregressive system either with the USA, Korea or China as a third 
country. This split matches the classification obtained by previous work on the basis of 
correlations of supply disturbances with annual data and structural VARs (Baek and 
Song, 2002). However, using quarterly data, we find, with similar unconditional or 
conditional correlations, that this classification collapses.  
Second, in a framework where cross-country correlations depend on the phase of 
the growth cycle, there is an apparent asymmetry between Japanese disturbances and 
other East Asian countries’ disturbances in the growth-recession regime. Such an 
asymmetry is robust to the choice of third country alongside Japan (i.e. the U.S., Korea 
or China) and the inclusion of transmission variables such as multilateral export growth 
by the domestic country or Japanese financial flows. However, this result seems to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




due to measurement problems in the collection of quarterly national accounts, which are 
well known in the Japanese case. When we substitute a better quality series for Japanese 
output since 1993, we get evidence of symmetry in growth recessions between Japan and 
either China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan.  
Third, with the low quality Japanese data, the symmetry of disturbances in the 
‘rapid-growth’, or catching-up, regime concerns Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and 
weakly the Philippines. When transmission variables such as export growth, or the 
Japanese financial account, are controlled for, such evidence vanishes. Instead, China, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan become positively correlated with Japan. The use of 
high quality Japanese output data confirms this classification. Besides, in the normal-
growth regime disturbances are never symmetric with Japanese growth shocks. 
The conflicting evidence about East Asian growth cycle correlations in previous 
literature seems to have arisen from the reliance on linearity assumptions which were 
never tested, the neglect of more powerful transmission mechanisms than simply bilateral 
trade, or the use of low quality output data. The extent of intra-industry trade in East 
Asia, both inside the region and with the outside world, mostly generated by a 
spectacular wave of foreign direct investment, in particular from Japan, is quickly 
generating strong interdependencies between Japan and other East Asian countries. The 
synchronization of these countries’ cycles with Japan is not yet full. The results we 
obtained indicate that during the 1990s symmetry of disturbances with Japan in both 
growth-recessions and rapid-growth regimes, concerns five out of nine East Asian 
countries (China, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and possibly Korea). On the basis of 
these results, it would still seem premature for such a set of East Asian countries to 
engage in monetary cooperation on the basis of exchange rate arrangements giving a 




proceeded in the 1990s, it may not take long for synchronization with Japan to reach a 
high degree. However, a significant part of the common movements are driven by U.S. 
growth, given the dependence of most countries in the region on exports to the U.S. and 
FDI from the U.S.  
On a methodological front, the estimations conducted in this paper for cross-
country synchronization have shown the importance of controlling for the presence of 
appropriate transmission variables and of ensuring the reliability of the data used. Further 
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Figure A.2. Hong Kong 
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Figure A.3. Indonesia 
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Figure A.4. Korea 
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Figure A.5. Malaysia 
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Figure A.6. Philippines 
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Figure A.7. Singapore 
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Figure A.8. Taiwan 
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Figure A.9. Thailand 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for growth rates of seasonally adjusted real GDP  





Minimum Maximum Skewness  Excess 
kurtosis 
China*  2.22 1.21 -1.60 5.79 -0.34 1.65 
Hong  Kong  1.54 2.20 -4.47  10.84  0.56 2.49 
Indonesia  1.25 1.67 -10.4 4.31 -3.96 23.3 
Japan  0.74 0.91 -3.19 2.86 -0.72 2.62 
Korea  1.74 2.01 -7.76 7.34 -0.97 5.05 
Malaysia  1.60 1.67 -6.98 5.30 -1.56 5.49 
Philippines  0.77 1.76 -5.67 6.54 -1.30 3.77 
Singapore  1.68 1.53 -2.95 5.98 -0.58 1.19 
Taiwan**  1.82 1.21 -1.50 6.05 0.23 1.67 






Table 2: Unconditional correlation







 1975-2001 1975:2-  2002:2 





b -0.19  -0.067  0.03 
Hong 
Kong 
0.52*** 0.177** 0.26*** 
Indonesia 0.52*** 0.163** 0.32*** 
Korea 0.46**  0.068  0.15* 
Malaysia 0.41**  0.254***  0.35*** 
Philippines 0.22  0.094  0.13* 
Singapore 0.31*  0.146* 0.22** 
Taiwan 0.55***  0.239***  0.31*** 
Thailand 0.64*** 0.106 0.30*** 
a) The significance of correlations is assessed using Anderson’s (1958) z test. Denoting  ρ the correlation 
coefficient, we compute z as  z = {(1/2) log [(1+ρ)/(1- ρ)]}/[1/(T-3)]
(1/2) . Critical values are obtained from 
a normal distribution with (T-3) degrees of freedom, where T is the number of observations.  
b)1978:2-2002:2;  





Table 3a: Linear VAR: correlations between annual growth rates of GDP with Japan:  
1977-2001 
 Trivariate  VAR
b   Bivariate 










a 0.07  -0.07 -  0.03 
Hong 
Kong 
0.53***  0.46** 0.36* 0.46** 
Indonesia  0.57***  0.49** 0.49** 0.49** 
Korea 0.71*** - 0.62***  0.65*** 
Malaysia  0.68*** 0.57*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 
Philippines  0.16 0.16 0.11 0.13 
Singapore  0.59***  0.48** 0.36* 0.46** 
Taiwan 0.35*  0.35* 0.25 0.34* 
Thailand  0.70*** 0.67*** 0.64*** 0.63*** 
a)  1979-2001. 
b)  significant at the *10%, **5%, *** 1% level 
 
 
Table 3b: Linear VAR: correlations between quarterly growth rates with official Japanese 















a -0.06  -0.07  -  0.00  -0.04 
Hong 
Kong 
0.12 0.10  0.16**  0.09  0.14* 
Indonesia 0.014  0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00 
Korea  0.012  -  0.08 0.06 0.10 
Malaysia  0.177**  0.17** 0.18** 0.19** 0.16** 
Philippines  0.107  0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Singapore 0.026  0.01  0.02  -0.00  0.00 
Taiwan 0.086  0.06 0.04 0.08 0.12 
Thailand  -0.083  -0.09 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 
a)  1978:2-2002:2. 
b)  significant at the *10%, **5%, *** 1% level 
 
Table 3c: Linear VAR: correlations between quarterly growth rates with high quality Japanese 














China* 0.09  0.12  - 0.19**  0.11 
Hong 
Kong 
0.15*  0.13* 0.19** 0.13* 0.17** 
Indonesia  0.14* 0.13*  0.12 0.18** 0.12 
Korea 0.027 -  0.11  0.12  0.13* 
Malaysia 0.23** 0.22** 0.25** 0.24** 0.22** 
Philippines  0.14*  0.09 0.05 0.09 0.09 
Singapore  0.06 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 
Taiwan 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.02  0.14* 






Table 4: Trivariate Markov-switching VAR with Japan and the U.S: Specification search** 
















China -  303.28  48.84  87.8  n.a.  73.8 
Hong Kong  - 406.51  71.00  98.18  n.a.  58.8 
Indonesia -  349.5 94.4  107.0  76.1  32.0 
Korea  -391.7  100.8  78.8 67.5 29.9 
Malaysia  -377.06  109.28  45.8 75.3 70.2 
Philippines  -383.66  91.88  76.4 74.6 63.9 
Singapore
* -  394.3  36.2
b 69.8
c n.a. 65.5 
Taiwan  -  325.6  74.6 89.8 85.7 19.4 
Thailand  -  357.0  102.06  89.0 58.7 51.2 
* MSIH model; Markov Switching (MS) models have a switching intercept (I), switching variance (H) 
and/or switching autoregressive coefficients (A). LR=Likelihood Ratio.  






(11)=19.6;  d) χ
2
(29)= 42.5. e) χ
2
(36)= 50.9; f) 
χ
2
(12) = 21.0; 
 






  Standard 
deviation 
 








0.40 1.49 0.68 























































0.55 1.23 0.69 
a)  Growth at quarterly rate; t statistic between brackets. 



















Regime 1  2  3 1 2  3
China
* 0.62  0.81  0.81 2.63 5.32  5.42
Hong Kong 0.56  0.83  0.58 2.27 6.06  2.44
Indonesia 0.50  0.95  0.89 2.03 21.6  9.2
Korea 0.69 0.92  0.47 3.29 12.5  1.89
Malaysia 0.20  0.83  0.63 1.26 6.09  2.73
Philippines 0.09  0.89  0.82 1.10 9.12  5.64
Singapore 0.63  0.82  0.81 2.76 5.76  5.40
Taiwan 0.51  0.77  0.54 2.05 4.36  2.18
Thailand 0.65  0.85  0.77 2.87 6.67  4.44
* 1978:2-2002:2; a) regimes as defined in table 5 
 




With   third   country
 e  Bivariate  VAR
 e   
Correlation 
with Japan 
Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3  Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3 
China^
b  -0.04 -0.42** 0.05  0.05  -0.02  -0.52*** 
Hong Kong  -0.65***  0.01  -0.18**  0.99***  0.23**  0.00 
Indonesia  -0.54*** -0.01 0.43***  -0.20*  -0.04 0.63*** 
Korea
c  -0.33** 0.13*  -0.76***  -0.78*** 0.10  0.29** 
Malaysia  0.88*** 0.13* 0.71***  -0.47***  0.25**  0.00 
Philippines -0.68*** 0.01  0.21**  -0.55*** 0.07  0.11 
Singapore
d  -0.59***  -0.00  -0.50***  -0.21** 0.01 -0.23** 
Taiwan  -0.31** -0.25** 0.28**  -0.49***  -0.20** 0.31** 
Thailand 0.12*  -0.06  0.47***  -0.30***  0.13*  -0.30** 
a) Regime 1= growth recessions; regime 2= normal growth; regime 3= rapid growth; 
b) Regime 1= normal growth; regime 2= rapid growth; regime 3= growth recessions; 
c) Regime 1= growth recessions, high volatility; regime 3= growth recessions, low volatility; 
d) regime 2= normal growth, high volatility; regime 3= normal growth, low volatility. 
^ 1978:2-2002:2 
e) significant at the *10%, **5%, *** 1% level 
 




 VAR  with 
Korea 





Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3  Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3 
China
b  -0.01  -0.30***  0.19**  - - - 
Hong  Kong  -0.20**  -0.00 -0.10 0.01  -0.05 -0.66*** 
Indonesia  -0.45***  -0.20**  -0.04 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13* 
Korea  - - - -0.05  0.11  -0.18** 
Malaysia  0.25**  -0.07 -0.09 0.03  0.47***  -0.06 
Philippines  -0.71*** 0.10  -0.21**  -0.91*** 0.12  0.43*** 
Singapore  -0.68*** -0.06  -0.17**  -0.52*** -0.49*** 0.57*** 
Taiwan  -0.57*** -0.00  -0.66*** -0.45*** -0.06  -0.38*** 
Thailand  0.19**  -0.31*** 0.32***  -0.32*** -0.01  0.17** 
a)  Regime 1= growth recessions; regime 2= normal growth; regime 3= rapid growth 
b)   1978:2-2002:2;  





Table 9: Regime-switching VAR with country  GDP growth, export growth (or Japanese 




VAR with  export 
growth 





Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3  Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3 
China
b  -0.34*** 0.01 0.44***  -0.45***  -0.34***  0.49*** 
Hong  Kong  -0.29*** 0.02  -0.19**  -0.68*** 0.11  -0.13* 
Indonesia
c  -0.17**  -0.42*** 0.10 -0.44*** -0.07  0.12 
Korea
c  -0.51*** 0.21**  0.20** -0.45***  0.02  0.30*** 
Malaysia 0.01  0.10  0.17**  0.02  -0.03  0.33*** 
Philippines -0.27***  -0.13* 0.26**  -0.45*** -0.05 -0.23*** 
Singapore -0.21***  -0.03  0.70***  -0.57***  -0.14*  0.22*** 
Taiwan  -0.36***  -0.29*** 0.09 -0.26***  -0.30***  0.58*** 
Thailand  -0.09 -0.43***  0.28*** -0.05 -0.22*** 0.13* 
a)  Regime 1= growth recessions; regime 2= normal growth; regime 3= rapid growth 
b)  1978:2-2002:2;  
c)  One lag. 




Table 10: Regime-switching VAR with and without USA (mixed Japanese series). 
1975:2-
2002:2 
With   third  Country





Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3  Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3 
China
c 0.69***  0.04  -0.31***  -0.09  -0.35***  -0.25*** 
Hong  Kong 0.18**  0.10  -0.10 0.33*** 0.07 -0.29*** 
Indonesia 0.10  -0.15*  0.52***  0.15*  -0.14*  -0.00 
Korea
b  0.47*** 0.04 -0.75*** -0.01  0.04 -0.40*** 
Malaysia  0.47*** 0.26*** 0.76***  0.03  0.20**  -0.03 
Philippines -0.75***  0.33*** 0.09 -0.23***  0.18** -0.15* 
Singapore 0.11  -0.15*  -0.08  -0.32***  0.01  -0.21** 
Taiwan  0.45*** -0.10 0.24***  -0.75*** -0.09  -0.02 
Thailand  -0.55*** 0.35*** -0.33*** -0.72*** 0.49*** -0.63*** 
a) Regime 1= growth recessions; regime 2= normal growth; regime 3= rapid growth 
b) Regime 1= growth recessions, high volatility; regime 2= normal growth; regime 3= growth recessions, low 
volatility, for trivariate VAR. 
c) 1978:2-2002:2 





Table 11: Japanese mixed data: Regime-switching VAR with domestic country’s GDP 
growth, export growth (or Japanese financial account) and Japanese growth. 
1975:2-
2002:2 
VAR with  export 
growth
c 






Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3  Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3 
China
b  -0.96***  0.07  0.46***  0.32*** -0.13* 0.38*** 
Hong  Kong  -0.17**  -0.00 -0.13 -0.00  0.41***  0.10 
Indonesia  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Korea 0.23***  0.38***  -0.29***  0.28***  -0.01  -0.75*** 
Malaysia  -0.26***  0.30*** 0.11 0.32*** 0.01  -0.08 
Philippines -0.00  0.20***  -0.29***  0.14*  -0.39***  -0.47*** 
Singapore 0.55***  -0.23***  0.70***  0.49***  0.10  -0.24*** 
Taiwan -0.21**  -0.35***  -0.02  0.18**  -0.23***  0.48*** 
Thailand -0.33***  0.29***  -0.54***  -0.18**  -0.14*  -0.47*** 
a)  Regime 1= growth recessions; regime 2= normal growth; regime 3= rapid growth 
b)   1978:2-2002:2 
c)  Significant at the *10%, **5%, *** 1% level 
 
 